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BROKERS-DUTY OF REkL ESTATE BRoE To PRiNCPiI.-DoUrnzL En -
PLOY2ENT.The plaintiff, assignee of a broker employed to sell defendant's
realty, sued for the agreed commission. The vendor alleged that the broker,
by secretly representing the vendee, had been guilty of fraud. The evidence
showed that after the making of the oral contract of sale but before it was
written and enforceable, the broker, without the vendor's knowledge, tool:
a commission from the vendee for reselling the property to a third psrzen
at a higher price. The lower court allowed recovery and the defendant
appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Locbcl z. Jcrolci¢,n k1925,
N. J. Sup. Ct.) 12S Atl. 609.
The real estate broker ordinarily need not execute a sale, though com-
missioned "to sell", in order to earn his commission. Steacl e. Scgcaat
(190S) 74 N. J. Eq. 20, 6S Atl. 1106. A condition precedent to his right to
commission is merely that he produce a purchaser. Stcmlcr v. BEag (103)
153 Calif. 791, 96 Pac. 309. A fortiori, if he secures a written contract of
sale his obligation to the vendor terminates. Fairly v. Wappoo Mill3 (183)
44 S. C. 227, 22 S. E. 108. Or, if he is commissioned to sell at a fined price,
it is not fraudulent to accept at any time a commission from the vendee for
resale, as the vendor's interests are predetermined and would be unaffected.
Gilliland v. Jaynzes (1912) 36 Okla. 563, 129 Pac. 8; Kinsand v,. Grirnshawo
(1907) 146 N. C. 397, 59 S. E. 1000. But it is a fair inference in the in-
stant case that the broker was under an obligation to secure the purchaser
who would pay the highest price. Therefore, the question before the court
was whether or not this obligation to the principal was performed when
the oral agreement of sale was made. This problem is raised but not
decided in Dickinon v. Updike (1901, N. J.) 49 Ati. 712. The broker
would lose his commission by doing anything inconsistent with the faithful
discharge of his obligations to his principal. Ebcrt v. HaslhcU (1914) 217
Mass. 209, 104 N. E. 556; Brown v. Hurt (1917) 193 Mich. 276, 164 N. W.
386. This rule applies although the principal is not damaged thereby.
Quinn v. Burton (1907) 195 Mass. 277, 81 N. E. 257. And he subjects him-
self also to suit by his principal for the extra profits. EKcmharl v. Schafer
(1913) 88 Ran. 691, 129 Pac. 1137. Here, however, when the oral contract
of sale was made, the broker had performed in good faith the entire service
expected of him. Even assuming that the agency continued, the broker
had thereafter no privilege to advise a breach of the agreement, for, it
would seem, he was under the duty of any third party not to induce the
breach of a contract, even though it is unenforceable. Cumbchrlavd Mfg. Co.
v. Dewitt (1913) 120 Md. 381, 87 At. 927; Vaught v. Pcttyjohn & Co.
(1919) 104 Kan. 174, 178 Pac. 623; contra: Davidson -0. Oac  (1910) 60
Tex. Civ. App. 269, 128 S. W. 944; Sonnczbcrg v. Hajek (1921, Tex. Civ.
App.) 233 S. W. 563. Being under a duty not to interfere with the oral
contract, there would seem to be no reason left to forbid him to deal with
the property for the buyer, regardless of whether the agency might be
said to have terminated.
CONTRACTS--OUSTER OF JURISDICTION-AGREELIENT TO LITIGATP Irr Fon-
EIGN COURT ONLY HELD INOPERATIrV-The plaintiff, a resident of the United
States, and the defendant, a resident of Germany, contracting together,
agreed to litigate disputes by German law and in German courts only.
This action was brought for anticipatory breach of contract. The lower
court dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The
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plaintiff appealed. Held, that the order be reversed. Sudbury v. Ambi
Verwaltung Kommanditgesellsehaft Auf Aktion (1925, 1st Dept.) 213 App.
Div. 98, 210 N. Y. Supp. 164.
The instant case is but one of the many which hold that an agreement
which ousts a court of jurisdiction is not a bar to an action commenced in
that court. 3 Williston, Contracts (1920) sec. 1725; see Insurance Co. v.
Morse (1874)o 87 U. S. 365. This rule seems to have sprung originally
from the jealous desire of the courts to protect their jurisdiction. See
United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co. (1915,
D. C. N. Y.) 222 Fed. 1006, 1008; Hale, Law Making By Unofficial Minorl
ties (1920) COL. L. RaV. 451. The fact that justice was administered
mainly "to transfer land and money" to the king may have been an impor-
tant motivating force. Cf. Bolland, The General Eyre (1922) 18. The
contracts included within this rule fall into two distinct groups: (1) those
with an agreement to arbitrate, and (2) those with an agreement to settle
disputes in certain courts only. Until recently agreements to arbitrate
were not specifically enforceable, on the ground that they undertook to
oust the courts of jurisdiction. 3 Williston, op. cit. sec. 1719. Legislation,
however, is now effecting a salutary change. N. Y. C. P. A., 1925,
sec. 1448; Sturges, Commercial Arbitration (1924) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
480; Grossman, Trade Security Under Arbitration Laws (1925) 35 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 308. As regards agreements to submit disputes to certain
courts only, some English courts have broken away from the old rule by
holding them agreements to arbitrate within the meaning of the Arbitra-
tion Act. The Cap Blanco (1913, L. R.) 48 Pro. Div. 130; Lloyd S. S. Co.
v. Grisham Life Ins. Co. [1903] 1 K. B. 249. And the same technique has
been employed in a lower New York Court. Kilvin Engineering Co. z.
Blanco (1925, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 125 Misc. 728. But it is submitted that
this is a strained interpretation of the arbitration acts. In New York in
the case of arbitration agreements the courts have retained a large amount
of control. They can upset the arbitrators' award if "clearly unreasonable".
In re Burke (1908) 191 N. Y. 437, 84 N. E. 405. And have jurisdiction
where "[1] the making of the contract or [21 the submission, or [3] the
failure to comply therewith" are in issue. Cahills' N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1923,
ch. 2, sec. 3; (1925) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 369. It is obvious that thare
is no such control in case of an agreement to submit to a particular foreign
court. In addition, while agreements to arbitrate will relieve the congestion
of litigation, the same is not true of the other type. Nevertheless, from
the standpoint of allowing the greatest possible freedom of contract consist-
ent with public policy the result of the New York case and the English
cases seems desirable. Cf. Mittenthal v. Mascagni (1903) 183 Mass. 19, 66
N. E. 425, and the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Daley v. People's Bld'g
Assoc. (1901) 178 Mass. 13, 59 N. E. 452. It is submitted that this
strained interpretation of the arbitration acts is a strong indication that
the archaic rule upheld in the instant case is no longer satisfactory; but
it is believed that the desired result might better be accomplished by a
direct overruling.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-CONSTRUCTION OF NON-CLAIM STATUTE.
-Upon becoming of age, the plaintiff discovered that his deceased guardian
had misappropriated a fund held in trust for him. The administrator had
filed his final account making no mention of the trust fund. The plaintiff
brought this action against the administrator on the claim. The lower
court gave judgment for the defendant. Held, (one judge dissenting) that
the judgment be affirmed, on the ground that the claim was not filed within
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sLx months after publication of notice to creditors as required by the statute
of non-claim. Davis v. Shcpaid (1925, Wash.) 237 Pac. 21.
Under some statutes the probate court may, in its discretion, before the
final settlement of the administrator's account, allow a clain which was
not filed within the prescribed period after the first publication of notice to
creditors. State v. Ross (1916) 133 Minn. 172, 157 N. W. 1075; Broxn V.
Forscle (1880) 43 Mich. 492, 5 N. W. 1011; Allc;z r. Conllin (1897) 112
Mich. 74, 70 N. W. 339 (recovery allowed in Equity after final settlement
of the estate, where the decedent had fraudulently misappropriated the
trust fund). Under other statutes certain claims are given priority, such
priority being lost by failure to present the claim within the pre~cribeI
time. Harvester Co. v. Algic (1917) 101 Kan. 654, 168 Pac. 87G; Wolfe V.
Knapp (1905) 127 Iowa, 479, 103 N. W. 369. An unpreferrcd claim not
filed within the prescribed time is barred unless special circumstances are
shown. Ball v. James (1916) 176 Iowa, 647, 15S N. W. 684 (where evidence
of claim was discovered after period for filing had expired). A few
statutes allow recovery from the distributees. I, re MeAwland (1910, D. C.
N. J.) 235 Fed. 173 (New Jersey statute construed). Some statutes of
non-claim are absolute in barring all claims against the decedent's estate
which were not filed within the prescribed period. Bu!ttcPr'orth v. Brcdc-
reyer (1916) 89 Wash. 677, 155 Pac. 152; Dae'ds c,. C;arzcr (1918) 133 Arlh.
224, 202 S. W. 239; Hamil v. Flow-ers (1913) 184 Ala. 201, 63 So. 094;
National Band: v. Hotchkss (1911) 49 Colo. 593, 114 Pae. 310 (except as
to subsequently discovered assets of the estate). Where the cauze of action
has been fraudulently concealed, the limitation of action statutes (although
absolute in terms) are generally held not to run until the discovery of the
fraud. Morgan v. Tener (1877) 83 Pa. 305; 2 Wood, Limitation.- (4th ed.
1916) sec. 275; COMMENTS (1925) 34 YALu LAW JOunrAL, 432. Sortie
courts have held that the legislature, in framing a statute of non-claim in
absolute terms, must have intended that it should be subject to the -ame
construction (in case of fraud) as the limitation of action statutes. Baz
v. Fairbank- (1869) 49 N. H. 131; cf. Wickcs v. Walden (1911) 161 IM. App.
3; see Newberry v. Wilkinson (1912, C. C. A. 9th) 199 Fed. 673, U39
(Washington statute of non-claim construed). This analogy, however, was
not necessarily in point with the instant case, as the Washington limitation
of action statute (Rem. Comp. Sts. 1922, ch. 3, sec. 159, subd. 4) expreZ31y
provides for fraud, while the statute of non-claim (Rem. Comp. Sto. 1922,
ch. 3, sec. 1484) makes no mention of fraud. On the other hand, it scems
possible that the policy of settling estates finally at some given time may
give way to the desirability of affording protection to one in the situation
of the defrauded plaintiff.
FUTURE INTEREs--PowERs OF APFOINTMENT TO A CLASS--INTESTACY
DECLARED UPON DEFAULT OF APPOINTMENT.:-The testator gave his prop-
erty to trustees for the benefit of his wife for life, then for his son for life,
and upon the latter's death for such persons as the son should appoint, the
appointment to be confined to "any relation or relations of mine of the whole
blood". There was no gift over in default of appointment. This action
was brought by the son upon a summons asking whether a release of the
power would create a partial intestacy so that the wife and son would
take the property as next of kin, subject to their life interests. Held, that
an intestacy would be created. Inz re Coombe [1925] 1 Ch. 210.
Where there is a power to appoint to or anmong a certain class of persons
but no express gift to the class and no gift over in default of appointment,
the courts, where the power has not been exercised, have nevertheless
generally distributed the property in equal shares to those members of the
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designated class who were living at the time the power should have been
exercised. Hazard v. Bacon (1920) 42 R. I. 415, 108 At. 499; 32 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 742; Gray, Powers in Trust (1911) 25 HARe. L. RTv. 12;
Brown v. Higgs (1801, Ch.) 8 Ves. 561; Re White's Thtsts (1860, Ch.)
Johns. 656; Farwell, Powers (3d ed. 1916) 528; Sugden, Powers (8th ed.
1861). 688-692. The result is sometimes reached by implying a gift to the
members of the class in default of appointment. Milhollen's Adm'r v. Rice
(1878) 13 W. Va. 510; Rogers v. Rogers (1859, Tenn.) 2 Head, 660. And
sometimes by regarding the power as held in trust to be exercised for the
benefit of the members of the designated class. Brown v. Higgs, supra;
Waterman v. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. (1922, 2d Dept.) 204 App,
Div. 12, 197 N. Y. Supp. 438. Whatever the theory, the result is the same
and, until recently, has been quite uniformly reached. Late English cases,
however, have insisted that the rule is not absolute and that the distribu-
tion is not to be made unless there is a clear indication of an intent to
benefit the members or some of the members of the class regardless of
appointment. In re Weeke's Settlement [1897] 1 Oh. 289; Re Hall (1899,
Ch.) 1 Ir. R. 308; cf. Re Llewellyn's Settlement [1921] 2 Ch. 281. This
view has met with some unfavorable criticism. Farwell, op. cit. 529;
Gray, op. cit. 13-18. The court in the instant case held that "relations
of the whole blood" constituted too large and indefinite a class to permit
of finding an intention to benefit the objects irrespective of the exercise
of the power. Other courts, however, have construed somewhat similar
expressions as designating a definite and certain class. Brunsden v. Wool-
ridge (1765, Ch.) Amb. 507 ("poor relations" construed to include only
those who are objects of charity); In re Caplin's Will (1865, Ch.) 2 Dr.
& Sm. 531 ("friends and relations" construed as next of kin). But any
such narrowing of the denotation of the terms of the will is pro tanto a
rewriting of the instrument, and a trust intent inferable only when the
instrument is so rewritten, seems a manifest fiction. From the will, as
originally written, it seems impossible to infer an intention to benefit any
particular persons-in other words, there would be an intestacy upon the
non-exercise of the power.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-EFFECT IN FOREIGN COURTS OF CONFISCATION BY
UNSUCCESSFUL INSURGENT.-During the Carranza-Villa war, an officer of
the Villa army, which controlled a large area in Mexico, confiscated the
plaintiff's ore and sold it to the defendant. The plaintiff recovered dam-
ages for conversion of the ore. The court of Civil Appeals, reversing judg-
ment because of error in admission of testimony, held that the seizure and
sale "conveyed title" to the defendant, evidently on the grounds that Villa's
faction was a de facto government and that our courts would not review
acts of a foreign government toward its citizens within its territories.
Held, on appeal, that as the Villa faction was ultimately unsuccessful, its
confiscations would not be recognized as acts of a government, and being
wrongful, did not divest plaintiff of ownership. Cia. Minera. Ygnacio
Rodriguez Ramos, S. A. v. Bartlesville Zinc Co. (1925, Tex.) 275 S. W. 388.
In a dictum on which the court relied it is stated that the validity of
confiscations by an insurgent government depends entirely on its survival,
since the legal effects of "all such acts perish with it". See Williamd V.
Bruffy (1877) 96 U. S. 176, 186. That case, however, decided only that it
was no defense in an action on a debt that the debtor's property had been
confiscated by the Southern Confederacy. In fact, it was intimated that
the confiscation would have been a good defense to an action by a bailor
suing his bailee for conversion of the confiscated goods. See ibid. at 187.
Furthermore, the court in that case seems to have had in mind a rule only
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for the courts of the country in which the revolution had occurred, and to
have based its discussion more on domestic policy than on rules of interna-
tional law. Cf. Sterens r. Griffliths (1884) 111 U. S. 48, 4 Sup. Ct. 233;
Nankivel v. Omsk All-Rzssian Govcrnim nt (1923) 237 N. Y. 150, 142 X. E.
569. In at least two cases our courts have given effect to "assessments" by
a Mexican de facto government. Octjc;z v. Ccztral Lcathcr Co. (1918)
246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309; Ricaud v. Avzcrcan Metal Co. (1913) 2,6
U. S. 304, 38 Sup. Ct. 312. It is true that one reason for theze decisions
was that political recognition had later been extended to the government
in question; but it was not decided that absence of political recognition pre-
cluded giving effect to the confiscations; and the decision of the state court
in the Oetjen, case, which was handed down before political recognition had
been accorded, was to the effect that a confiscation for war purposes by a
de facto government passes title to the goods. O'Nciff v. Cc,.mrl Lc ,.cr
Co. (1915) 87 N. J. L. 552, 94 AtI. 789. Even in a court of a country where
a revolution took place this rule has been followed. Lcnzh ,l~ u. Kock,
Transvaal L. R. [1903] T. S. 451. This rule seems sounder than that of
the instant case in that it recognizes the realities of the situation. There
is really no reason why our courts should not give effect to all acts of un-
recognized de facto governments which are not contrary to our mores and
which do not materially weaken our foreign policy. See Soholoff v. N -
tional City Bank (1924) 239 N. Y. 158, 165, 145 N. E. 917, 919; Rzecsia
Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard (1925) 240 N. Y. 149, 147 X. E. 703; COM-
MENTS (1925) 35 YALE LAW JOURN.AL, 93, 101; Angell, Soerceign IRauity
-The Modern. Trend ibid. 150. It by no means follows that all confiscations
by bandits would have to be given effect, since, in the ab.ence of recognition
by the political departments, the court may receive evidence to prove the
de facto character of the insurgent rdgime. O'Neill '. Cetral Lcathwcr
Co., szpra.
INTERNATIONAL L.AW-INTOXICATING LIQUORS-INTERPREI'ATION OF "ONE
HouR's TRAYVE" CLAUSE IN SEARCH .N SEtzuns Tanry W7ITH GnrT
BniT .- The defendants, master and crew of a British vessel, were
charged with violation of the Volstead Act. At the time of the arrest, the
vessel lay further from the Florida coast than she could travel in one hour.
There was evidence that liquor had been unloaded into "contact" boatz
from shore. The district court charged the jury that although there was
no proof of the speed of any particular boat used or intended to be used,
the defendants were subject to arrest under the terms of the treaty with
Great Britain if such "contact" boats as were ordinarily used in that
locality could reach the vessel in one hour. The defendants were convicted
and moved for a new trial because of this charge. Held, that the motion
be overruled. United States v,. Henning (1925, D. C. Ala.) 7 Fed. (2d) 488.
Since the treaty with Great Britain (43 Stat. at L. 1761) reasserts the
freedom of the high seas outside the three-mile limit and merely concedes
to the United States certain specific "rights" (privileges) thereon of search
and seizure, it is implied that the terms of these concessions should be
narrowly construed. The treaty specifically states that "the rights con-
ferred . . . shall not be exercised at a greater distance from the
coast . . . than can be traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected
1 , or in case it is intended to use another vessel for transshipment
ashore, "the speed of such other vessel . . . shall determine the dis-
tance from the coast". Art. 2, sec. 3. The broad interpretation given to
this provision in the instant case is contrary to the implications of several
recent cases. The Over the Top (1925, D. Conn.) 5 Fed. (2d) 833 (one
ground for dismissing libel being failure to show speed of "contact" boat
YALE LAW JOURNAL
in circumstances similar to those under which it was seized); The Pictonian
(1924, E. D. N. Y.) 3 Fed. (2d) 145 (leave given to amend to show speed
of particular boat used). As a purely practical matter, the courvs inter-
pretation doubtless would be a material aid in the enforcement of prohibi-
tion. It is submitted, however, that the decision is contrary to the express
terms of the treaty, which requires evidence of the speed of a specific vessel.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-MEANING OF "RESIDENT" IN TRADING WITH THE
ENEMY A.-The plaintiff, a German subject, lived in the United States
for seven years prior to May 1917, when he went to Germany to settle an
estate. The Alien Property Custodian seized funds belonging to him as
enemy-owned property, under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917
(40 Stat. at L. ch. 106, p. 411), which defines an enemy as one "resident
within enemy territory during the war". The plaintiff after his return
brought suit under section 9(a) of the Act, providing for the recovery by
non-enemies of seized property.* Held, that the complaint be dismissed
since the plaintiff's physical presence in Germany made him a "resident"
within the meaning of the Act. Stadtmuller v. Miller (1925, D. C. S. D.
N. Y.) Not yet reported.
"Residence" is a term of many connotations; but in international law and
the construction of statutes relating thereto it has generally meant more
than mere physical presence. Enemy character for prize purposes has
been determined by "commercial domicile", the maintenance of a place of
business in enemy territory. The Venus (1814, U. S.) 8 Cranch, 253.
For other purposes, it has been construed as the equivalent of domicile.
In re Schneider (1908, C. C. 2d) 164 Fed. 335 (naturalization) ; Do Bouchel
v. Candler (1924, N. D. Ga.) 296 Fed. 482 (divorce); Anderson v. Pifer
(1925) 315 Ill. 164, 146 N. E. 171 (eligibility to vote). Some courts have
said that "residence" means a fixed abode for the time requisite for the
particular purpose in question. See Brisenden v. Chamberlain (1892, C. C.
4th) 53 Fed. 307, 311; Penfield v. Chesapeake, Ohio & S. W. B. R. (1890)
134,U. S. 351, 357, 10 Sup. Ct. 566, 569. So that where there was no fixed
abode, there was no "residence". Ibid; Barney v. Oelrichs (1891 ) 138 U. S.
529, 11 Sup. Ct. 414. The Attorney General gave this construction to the
term "residence" in the Trading with the Enemy Act. Meares, Trading
with the Enemy Act (1924) 78, 81. At least two courts have thought domi-
cile essential. Vowinckel v. First Fed. Trust Co. (1925, C. C. A. 9th)
No. 4574 (not yet reported) and Kahn v. Garvan (1920, S. D. N. Y.) 263
Fed. 909, 915. The court in the instant case, in holding transient presence
sufficient to constitute "residence" has, it is believed, given too narrow and
unusual a construction to the term. The Treaty of 1799, revived by Article
XII of the Treaty of 1828, accords citizens of either country "residing" in
the other nine months within which to remove their property without moles-
tation. A high authority has criticized as violative of the spirit of the
Treaty the interpretation of the Supreme Court confining this protection
against seizure to persons physically within the United States, the author
stating that the Treaty, like all the others of that time, was designed to pro-
tect against premature seizure the private property of all citizens of the
enemy state, regardless of their physical location. Moore, International
Law and Some Current Illusions (1924) 1, 20. See Stoehr v. Wallace
(1921) 255 U. S. 239, 251, 41 Sup. Ct. 293, 298.
LImITATION OF ACTIONS-GRAVAMEN OF ACTION DETERMINATIVE AS TO
WHICH PERIOD OF LIMITATION APPLIES.-The plaintiff purchased a ticket
entitling him to enter the defendant amusement company's park, and while
therein was kicked by a horse belonging to the present plaintiff in error
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who was impleaded with the amusement company. Under N. Y. C. P. A.
1921, sec. 49, an action to recover damages for personal injury resulting
from negligence must be commenced within three years. Under sce. 48 an
action upon a "contract obligation or liability express or implied" must be
commenced within six years. Almost four years after the cause of action
accrued the plaintiff sued, basing his complaint on the contract. The
plaintiff in error moved to dismiss the complaint and, the motion being
denied, appealed. Held, (two judges disscnting) that the gravamen of
the action being negligence the three year period of limitation applied, and
that the decision be reversed. Herines v. Westchestcr Racing Assoc. (1923,
1st Dept.) 213 App. Div. 147, 210 N. Y. Supp. 114.
The application of the earliest statutes of limitation depended upon the
nature of the writ and the form of action brought. See Cokc on Little-
ton, sec. 115a. In some jurisdictions the form is still held to control.
Avery v. Miller (1890) S1 2Iich. 85, 45 N. W. 503; CocrsUll v. Butler (1897
C. C. E. D. Ark) 78 Fed. 679. In most jurisdictions, how~ever, it early
became the rule that the cause of action and not the form of the remedy
would control. See Wood, Limitations (4th ed. 1916) sec. 57a. Since
statutes of limitation have as their purpose the prevention of injustice
when time has destroyed the evidence, the form of action would seem to be
immaterial. Cf. Wood v. Carpenter (1879) 101 U. S. 135. Despite the
existence of facts that would ground an action in contract, the gravamen
of the action has in many cases been held to be negligence and the limita-
tion period appropriate to actions for negligent injury applied. Marty V.
Somers (1917) 35 Calif. App. 182, 169 Pac. 411 (malpractice); Wcbber v.
Herkimer & M. Street Ry. (188) 109 N. Y. 311, 16 N. E. 358 (common
carrier); Krebenfos v. Lindauer (1917) 175 Calif. 431, 166 Pac. 17 (employ-
ment); Kelly v. Western U. Tel. Co. (1897) 17 Tex. Civ. App. 344, 43 S. W.
532 (mental anguish for non-delivery of death notice) ; see also (1923) 23
Coi. L. REv. 977; (1919) 1 A. L. R. 1313. There appears to have been little
attempt made to define the term "gravamen", but it is submitted that it is
nothing else than the group of material fact-the cause of action. See
Frazier v. Georgia R. R. (1897) 101 Ga. 70, 74, 28 S. E. 684. But, ad-
mittedly, the cause of action in the instant case, as in many of thoZe cited
above, is both a breach of contract and a negligent personal injury. The
consistent preference that the courts show for the shorter limitation
periods appropriate to negligent injury must then be explained on other
grounds than the legalistic classification of the cause of action. Since
claims for personal injuries resulting from negligence are based on for-
tuitous occurrences wherein the legal responsibility of the defendant is
often very doubtful, prompt action by the parties to identify and trace
the persons who have happened to witness the transaction is more than
usually important. Such considerations, it is believed, are behind the
present statutes of limitation. But the fortuitousness of the occurrence
is unaltered by the fact that it may happen to constitute a breach of con-
tract. So it would seem that the election by the courts of the shorter limi-
tation period is eminently sound. On the facts of the instant case as
pleaded, however, it is impossible, as the dissent pointed out, to Cee how
there could be any question of a breach of contract by the plaintiff in error,
who was merely the owner of the fractious horse.
PuaImc OFFIcERS-REMoVAL "FoR NEGLECT 0P DUTY"--DsTN Iro 1 BE-
TwEE;N OFclArL AND INDnmUAL AcTs.-The defendant, a sheriff, while
purporting to restore peace in a pool room, struck a crippled onlooker with
his pistol and threw him into the street. The governor removed the sheriff
from office under the Kentucky constitution which provided for removal
"for neglect of duty". The sheriff appealed. Held, (two judges d1sscntiizg)
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that the governor's decree be cancelled 'on the ground that the sheriff had
not neglected any official duty, but had acted only as an individual.
Holliday v. Fields (1925) 210 Ky. 179, 275 S. W. 642.
There are, of course, many obvious distinctions between "official" and
"individual" acts. Throop, Public Officers (1892) sec. 367; see Common-
wealth v. Chambers (1829, Ky.) 1 J. J. Marsh. 108, 160. Thus the grounds
for removal in the following cases, under the typical "neglect of duty"
statutes, seem clearly to be neglect of "official" duties State v. Teeters
(1922) 112 Kan. 70, 209 Pac. 818 (non-enforcement of liquor laws); Coffey
v. Superior Court (1905) 147 Calif. 525; 82 Pac. 75 (permitting gambling);
Freas v. State (1925, Okla.) 235 Pac. 227 (permitting games of chance).
On the other hand, in the instant case, it is by no means clear that hitting
the onlooker was merely an individual act. "The court, in so deciding,
relied largely on a case which held that a county judge, drunk in his office
during business hours, was not drunk as an official, but as an individual.
Commwnwealth v. Williams (1880) 79 Ky. 42; see Craig v. State (1892) 31
Tex. Cr. App. 29, 19 S. W. 504. Hence it would seem that, under this
part of the Kentucky constitution, an officer could never act officially and
wrongly simultaneously. This is, in effect, the same theory which gave
rise to the doctrine that the state is not responsible for the torts committed
by its servants while performing governmental acts. Cf. Jewett v. Neut
Haven (1871) 38 Conn. 368; Lewis v. State (1884) 96 N. Y. 71. And had
its historical basis in the theory that "the king can do no wrong." Bor-
chard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1, 2,
255. The weakness in practice of such theory is the result of a tendency
to consider gross violations of duty as personal, not official acts, and to
confuse "scope of authority" (construed as "legal authority") with "scope
of functions", and thus to create an extreme ultra vires theory. Deming,
Haftung des Staates Aus rechtswidrigen Handlungen seiner Beamten
(Frankfurt, 1879) 40-44. Many statutes providing for the removal of
officers, are, like the constitution in the instant case, so worded as to neces-
sitate deciding whether the act was "official" or merely "individual". Gen.
Sts. Minn. 1913, sec. 5724; see State v. Megaardon (1901) 85 Minn. 41, 88
N. W. 412; Heminway's Miss. Code, 1917, sec. 2815; Pruitt v. State (1917)
116 Miss. 33, 76 So. 761. But a more satisfactory statute would seem to be
of the type which provides for removal for "unfitness" or "cause" or some
similar term which breaks down the artificial distinction. 1 Civ. Code, S. C.
1912, sec. 695; State v. Sanders (1920) 118 S. C. 498, 110 S. E. 808
(adultery rendered a sheriff unfit for that office); Rev. Sts. Me., 1857, ch.
7, sec. 15; State v. Leach (1872) 60 Me. 58 (recorder of deeds removed for
making a false oath). In the instant case the holding did not preclude re-
moval, for the court in a dictum said that the defendant might be indicted
for "malfeasance in office", a statutory ground of removal which involved
a jury trial. But it would seem more desirable to hold with the minority
that since the sheriff purported to act as an official the single act of hitting
the individual should not be separated from the official activity.
REAL PROPERTY-EQUITABLE RELIEF GRANTED WHERE IDIPROVEMENT MADE
3Y MISTAKE ON LAND OF ANOTHER.-The defendant built upon a lot which
both he and the plaintiffs thought belonged to the defendant. About five
years later the plaintiffs discovered that fifty feet of the lot belonged to
them and sued for an accounting. Held, that the plaintiffs should either
convey their land to the defendants upon receipt of the value of the land
unimproved, with a reasonable rental for its use, or pay the defendants
the value of the improvements. Ryan v. Cincinnati Model Homes Co.
(1925, Ohio C. P.) 25 N. P. (N. s.) 574.
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The rightful owner of land was, at common law, entitled to improvement3
or betterments made thereon by mistake, on the theory that they beame
"a part of the freehold". Sedgwick & Wait, Trial of Title to Land (2d el.
1886) sec. 690. An action of quasi-contract cannot be maintainel.
Webster v. Stewart (1858) 6 Iowa, 401. The courts of equity, however,
influenced by the civil law, required the owner of land who sought relief to
make compensation for the improvements as a condition precedent to grant-
ing such relief. Rzeppa v. Seymour (1925) 230 BMich. 439, 203 N. W. 62; 3
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisdiction (4th ed. 1918) sec. 1241. Relief has alco
been granted in equity at the suit of the improver in a few caces. Brigl:t
v. Boyd (1841, C. C.) 1 Story, 478. (1843, s. c.) 2 Story, 605; Union Hall
Assoc. v. Morrison (1874) 39 Bld. 281; Hatcher v. Briggs (1876) 6 Or. 31;
contra: Schroll v. Klink:er (1846) 15 Ohio, 152; Anderson Z. Reid (1809) 14
App. D. C. 54; see Woodward, Quasi-Contracts (1913) sec. 187, and cazes
cited. Relief, it is often said, is granted the improver to prevent unjust
enrichment of the owner. McKelhlay v. Armour (1854) 10 N. J. Eq. 115.
But it has been pointed out that enrichment is sometimes not unjuzt, for a
"volunteer should get no pay", if, as is often the case, he is an "officiouz
intermeddler". Winthrop's Adin'rs v. Huntington (1828) 3 Ohio, 327.
And the improyements may be unwelcome. See McCoy r. Grandy 1854
3 Ohio St. 463, 466. Relief has been refused where the owner did not
know of the improvement. Friel v. Turk (1924, Ch.) 95 N. J. Eq. 425, 123
Atl. 610. But where the improvements have been made by mutual mistahe
induced by a third party, the improver has in equity been permitted to
recover. Pearl Township r. TJborp (1903) 17 S. D. 288, 96 N. W. 121
Where the mistake is mutual, it would seem that relief to the improver
should always be given, for there is unjust enrichment without "officious
intermeddling". Magnolia Constnction Co. v. McQuillan (1923) 94 N. J.
Eq. 736, 121 AtI. 734. This whole class of cases merge into the encroach-
ment cases, in which the granting of an injunction requiring removal of
the encroaching structure is within the discretion of the court. Croccr .
Manhattan Life Co. (1901, 1st Dept.) 61 App. Div. 226, 70 N. Y. Supp. 492;
Schwartz v. Holycross (1925, Ind. App.) 149 N. E. 699; contra: Marcu v.
Brody (1925, Mass.) 149 N. E. 673; Pile v. Pedriek (1895) 167 Pa. 296, 31
AtI. 646; see (1921) 14 A. L. R. 831, note; (1923) 33 Y,%LE LAW JoumnAL,
205. Persons improving land under color of title may recover under the
Occupying Claimant or Betterment Acts in most states. Griswold v. Bragg
(1880, C. C. D. Conn.) 48 Fed. 519.
RUL, PROPERTY-GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS OF LAND.-Prendergast conveyed
land to his daughter just before a serious operation. He recovered, and with
the daughter's consent returned to the land and controlled it as before. After
his death, the daughter claimed the land under the conveyance. The other
heirs brought an action to set aside the conveyance, alleging that it was a
gift causa mortis, which had been revoked by the recovery of the grantor.
The lower court held the conveyance valid, and the plaintiffs appealed.
Held, that the judgment be affirmed on the ground that land could not be the
subject of a gift causa, wortis. Prendergast v. Drcw (1925) 103 Conn. 8S,
130 At. 75.
A few cases have intimated that a gift causa mortis of land might be
made. Cf. Pluche o. Jones (1893, C. C. A. 5th) 54 Fed. 860; McCarty v.
Kearnan (1877) 86 Ill. 291; Peck z. Rees (1891) 7 Utah, 467, 27 Pac. 531.
The case of Curtiss v. Barrus (1885, N. Y.) 38 Hun, 165, sustained such a
gift; but the instant case is in accordwith the almost univerzal view to the
contrary. Wentworth v. Shibles (1896) 89 Me. 167, 36 At]. 108; I, 7o
Heiser's Estate (1913, Surro. Ct.) 85 Misc. 271, 147 N. Y. Supp. 557 (not
citing Curtiss v. Barrus, supra); Maecarel v. Mascarel's Exz'rs (1006) 3
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Calif. App. 501, 86 Pac. 617 (code provision). The reason is probably to
be found in the history of the doctrine. It was taken from the Civil Law.
See Fiero v. Fiero (1874, N. Y.) 5 Thomp. & C. 151, 152; 2 Blackstone,
Commentaries *514. The Ecclesiastical Courts of England, which had ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the administration of a decedent's personalty, but
no jurisdiction over land, derived many of their rules of decision from the
Civil Law. 3 Blackstone, op. cit. *95, *109. Originally a gift causa mortis
could be accomplished only by manual delivery of possession of the chattel.
See Chase v. Redding (1859, Mass.) 13 Gray, 418, 420. Later the doctrine
of gifts causa mortis was extended in chancery to include bank notes and
bonds. See Chase v. Redding, supra; Bradley v. Hunt (1832, Md.) 5 Gill. &
Johns. 54, 58. Constructive delivery is now allowed where manual delivery
of the subject matter of the gift is not practicable. Foley v. Harrison
(1911) 233 Mo. 460, 136 S. W. 354; Waite v. Grubbe (1903) 43 Or. 406, 13
Pac. 206. The fact that a gift of land requires a deed of conveyance doubt-
less prevented the extension of the doctrine to land. A gift causa mortis is
revocable by the donor before death. See Bunn v. Markham (1816, C. P.)
7 Taunt. 224, 231. A deed, however, is irrevocable, and takes effect upon
delivery. Moore v. Downing (1919) 289 Ill. 612, 124 N. E. 557; Hathaway
v. Payne (1865) 34 N. Y. 92 (where a deed delivered pending death of the
donor was held to pass property upon delivery, the death being considered
not a condition precedent, but a mere question of time). In Stiebol V.
Grosberg (1911) 202 N. Y. 266, 95 N. E. 692, however, it was held that a
deed could be delivered to the grantee subject to a parol condition precedent.
A few cases have sustained a gift causa mortis of personalty by deed, whore
the donor died from the impending peril. Meach v. Meach (1852) 24 Vt.
591 (the court recognizing that objections might be taken to the holding
on the ground that a deed is irrevocable); Kenistons v. Sceva (1873) 54
N. H. 24; Powell v. Leonard (1861) 9 Fla. 359. Quaere, whether a gift
causae mortis of a chattel by deed would be set aside if the donor should
live? Cf. Tate v. Hilbert (1793, Ch.) 2 Ves. Jr. 111, 120. If so, there
would seem to be a fair analogy in favor of holding the doctrine of gift
causa mortis applicable to land.
SEARCHES AND SEIZUREs-No RETURN OF CONTRABAND GOODS ILLEGALLY
SEIZE.-Books unmistakably obscene within the penal law were seized with.
out a warrant. The defendants in a prosecution for violation of the penal
law moved for a return of the books and suppression of the evidence. This
motion was denied. Held, upon a motion for a reargument, that the ruling
was correct. People v. Pomerantz (192'5, Sup. Ct.) 125 Misc. 570, 211 N. Y.
Supp. 767.
The court in the instant case treated the questions of suppression of the
evidence and the return of the goods as involving the determination of a
single issue. Obviously, the usual object of a petition for the return of
goods illegally seized is to challenge the competency of the evidence. Stato
v. McDaniel (1925, Or.) 231 Pac. 965. In jurisdictions where such evi-
dence is admissible, the goods will, of course, not be returned before trial.
Under the federal rule of exclusion of the evidence, many courts hold that
the goods will be returned, whether contraband or not. United States v.
Madden (1924, D. C. Mass.) 297 Fed. 679; People v. Jakira (1922, Gen.
Sess.) 118 Misc. 303, 193 N. Y. Supp. 306. But some courts, while refus-
ing to admit the evidence, require that there be a possibility of the defend-
ant's possession being lawful before ordering a return of the goods. State
v. Mc Daniel, supra; State v. Andrews (1922) 91 W. Va. 720, 114 S. ]I. 257.
And where the possession of the goods would necessarily be criminal, its
return will generally be denied. State v. Ditmar (1925, Wash.) 232 Pac.
321; People v. Didonna (1925, Spec. Sess.) 124 Misc. 872, 210 N. Y.
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Supp. 135; United States v. Rykowsky (1920, D. C. Ohio) 2G7 Fed. 866.
This seems illogical, for if the evidence is suppressed for all purpoSes, then,
strictly, there is no basis for a determination that possession of the prop-
erty would be in violation of law. Cf. United States v. Burns (1925, D. C.
Fla.) 4 Fed. (2d) 131; see 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sce. 2184;
(1921) 21 CoL L. REV. 291. And the reason for the rule of exclusion-
protection against unreasonable searches-is impaired. Where the goods
seized are clearly dangerous to society, however, there should be no prac-
tical difficulty in determining this in advance of trial, and it would seem to
be desirable to refuse to return such articles. See Atkinson, Prohibition.
and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case (1925) 23 MICH. L. REV. 74 , 759.
The refusal in the instant case may perhaps be justified on this ground.
Whether, further, the evidence obtained by the illegal search should be
excluded is still a controverted question. For a citation to differing views
by writers upon this subject, see Atkinson, svpra at 748, note. For a com-
plete review of the state of the authorities up to May, 1925, see the Came
article at 764. Since that writing, two states listed as uncertain have
adopted a definite position. Florida has adopted the federal rule. Hert
v. State (1925, Fla.) 103 So. 633. Colorado refused to follow this rule, and
held that the evidence unlawfully obtained was admissible. Macoaatunio
v. People (1925, Colo.) 236 Pac. 1019.
ToRTs-DxTH BY WRONGFUL Acr-FATHER'S BmwCH OF CHILD L%on
LAW BARs RECOVERY FOR DEATH OF SoN.-The plaintiff, as administrator of
his minor son's estate, sued the defendant for wrongfully causing the son's
death. The son was killed while operating defendant's elevator, and the
wrongful act complained .of was defendant's employment of the minor in
violation of the Child Labor Law. This statute also imposes a fine on
any parent who permits his child to be employed contrary to the statute.
The plaintiff recovered in the lower court. The Appellate Court reverzed,
treating the father's violation of the statute as contributory negligence.
Held, on appeal, that the plaintiff's participation in the illegal employment
bars his recovery. Newton v. Ill. Oil Co. (1925, Ill.) 147 N. E. 405.
It has been generally held in actions brought under wrongful death
statutes that a parent's contributory negligence, not arising from breach
of statute, defeats his recovery when he is sole beneficiary, whether the
suit is brought in the parent's name as administrator or by a third person.
Banberger v. Citizens' St. Ry. (1895) 95 Tenn. 18, 31 S. W. 103; Gunn -e.
Ohio Riv. R. R. (1896) 42 W. Va. 676, 26 S. E. 546. Where some but not
all the beneficiaries are negligent, the better rule is to bar recovery only as to
those negligent. Phillips v. Denver City Tram Co. (1912) 53 Colo. 453, 128
Pac. 460; Wolf v. Lake Erie & W. Ry. (1896) 55 Ohio St. 517, 45 N. E. 703.
Though it has been held that the negligence of one defeats recovery of all.
Toner's Adin'r v. So th Coy. Ry. (1900) 109 Ky. 41, 58 S. W. 439; Darbrin-
sky v. Pennsylvania Co. (1915) 248 Pa. 503, 94 At. 209. The principle
underlying these decisions is that to award damages to a beneficiary guilty
of contributory negligence would be to permit him to profit by his own
wrong. Wolf v. Lake Erie & W. Ry., szvpra; Star F re Clay Co. v. Budo 1920,
C. C. A. 6th) 269 Fed. 508. But a growing minority of jurisdictions in this
country has allowed recovery, even when the person suing was the sole
beneficiary. Warren v. Manchester St. Ry. (1900) 70 N. H. 352, 47 Atl.
735; Wymore v. Mahaska County (1889) 78 Iowa, 390, 43 N. W. 204; Me-
Kay iv. Syracuse Rapid Tr. Ry. (1913) 208 N. Y. 359, 101 N. E. 885. A
breach of statutory duty has been held negligence per so in civil actions.
Watkins -e. Naval Colliery Co., Ltd., (1912) L. R. App. Cas. 693; Martin
v. Herzog (1920) 228 N. Y. 164, 126 N. E. 814. The court might have
relied on this theory to deny recovery; it chose, however, to base it- decision
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on the ground that he who has participated in an illegal transaction cannot
claim damages arising therefrom. The idea that plaintiff must not profit
by his contributory fault underlies denial of recovery both when plaintiff's
wrong is contributory negligence and when it is breach of statute. Since
the former defense is breaking down, why should the courts continue to
uphold the latter? Cf. Minerly v. Union Ferry Co. (1890, Sup. Ct.) 56
Hun, 113, 9 N. Y. Supp. 104; COMMENTS (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
1090. Under Ill. Laws, 1917, sec. 13, p. 517, the plaintiff in the instant
case would be fined not more than twenty-five dollars for his violation of
the statute. To deny him recovery for the death of his son, which occurred
as much through defendant's wrongful act as through the plaintiff's, would
be to cast the entire loss resulting from the joint fault upon the plaintiff,
who is subject to a fine as well. See Consolidated Traction Co. v. Hone
(1896) 59 N. J. L. 275, 277, 35 At. 899, 900. Such a result deprives both
the Death Damage and Child Labor statutes of their force.
TORTS-FALSE IMPRISONMENT-DAMAGES AGAINST B LIMITED TO DETEN-
TION PRIOR TO ERRONEOUS COMMITMENT BY A UNDER LUNACY Acr.-The
plaintiff, judicially committeo to Dr. A.'s hospital for the insane, was
granted, subject to recall, a leave of absence under judicial order giving
to Dr. A. a privilege of retaking the plaintiff at any time his mental con-
dition required it. During this leave Dr. B., a Commissioner of Lunacy,
believing the plaintiff insane, detained him and advised Dr. A. to examine
him. Dr. A., honestly believing the plaintiff's condition required it, re-
committed him under authority of the original order. After nine years'
detention the plaintiff escaped and brought this action against Dr. A. and
Dr. B. The jury found that the plaintiff was sane at the time of recommit-
ment and the court allowed recovery against Dr. A. for that period of de-
tention only that was subsequent to the recommitment and against Dr. B.
for that period and for the period of detention in the latter's office as well.
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and the plaintiff appealed to
the House of Lords. Held, that since no negligence or malice was shown
the action was not maintainable against Dr. A., and that, as to Dr. B.,
damages must be limited to the detention prior to the recommitment, that
act constituting an efficient intervening force. Harnett v. Bond (1925,
H. of L.) 133 L. T. R. 482.
The English Lunacy Act of 1890, 53 Vict. ch. 5, sec. 330, provides im-
munity for all acts done thereunder unless malicious or negligent. Dr. A.
in the instant case was clearly within that immunity; but the responsibility
of Dr. B. is more difficult to determine. One who, without a warrant,
restrains another not reasonably thought to be dangerous to himself or
others, although reasonably thought to be insane, is responsible as in tres-
pass for false imprisonment at common law. Fletcher v. Fletcher (1859,
Q. B.) 1 El. & El. 420; Sinclair v. Broughton (1882, P. C.) 47 L. T. R. 170;
Look v. Dean (1871) 108 Mass. 116. The responsibility in such actions
extends to all harm directly resulting from the detention. Standard Oil
Co. v. Humphries (1923) 209 Ala. 493, 96 So. 629 (mental anguish);
Bragg v. Hatfield (1925, Me.) 130 AtI. 233 (miscarriage). And also
to harm directly resulting from the foreseeable acts of third parties, where
such acts are induced by the detention. Childs v. Lewis [1924, K. B.] 40
T. L. R. 870 (loss of employment); Filer v. Smith (1893) 96 Mich. 347, 55
N. W. 999 (newspaper account of arrest). But judicial commitment
breaks the causal chain in false imprisonment cases so as to limit recovery
to compensation for dtention prior to such commitment. Lock v. Ashton
(1848) 12 Q. B. 871; Sinclair v. Broughton, supra; McCullough v. Green-
field (1903) 133 Mich. 463, 95 N. W. 532. The act of recommitment by Dr.
A. may perhaps be regarded as a judicial act by delegated authority so as
to bring the case within this rule. Had the case arisen in this country,
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however, the disability of judges to delegate certain powers might prevent
such an interpretation. Cf. Ocampo z. United States (1914) 234 U. S. 91,
34 Sup. Ct. 712; Briggs v. Reynolds (1912) 176 Ill. App. 420. But in
the instant case the commitment by Dr. A. was scarcely induced by the de-
tention by Dr. B.; rather, by the notice and advice. At common law, in the
absence of facts constituting malicious prosecution, trespass for false
imprisonment was the only action for damages available for wrongful
detention. See Zikfein v. W. T. Grant Co. (1920) 23G Blass. 223, 233, 12,3
N. E. 24, 27. Whether a court would now entertain an action for harm
resulting from the negligent notice and advice may be considered doubtful.
But in any event it would seem by parity of reasoning that there chould
be the same limitation of responsibility as in the false imprisonment cases
involving judicial commitments. Cf. Lock v. Ashto,, spra; SZnzelair V.
Broz.ghton, supra; McCulloz,gh r. Greenfield, svpra. The security of the
individual is qualified by the necessity of protecting the public from
criminals and lunatics.
VENDOR AND PuR no ER-AnKIAnR.BLE TITLE-EFirECr OF CILUME- OF
CONDITION AND LAPSm OF TIME ON RESTRICIVE COvENANTS.-Original
deeds to lots sold by Gouverneur Mlorris in 1848 out of a tract of land
contained, inter alia, a covenant against the manufacture and sale of
intoxicating liquors. In 1849, an agreement releasing the covenant was
entered into by Iorris, his grantees, and others. The plaintiff sold the lot
to the defendant, the contract of sale containing no such covenant The
defendant rejected title as unmarketable, although it appeared that the
neighborhood had greatly changed, and that the covenant had been disre-
garded for seventy-five years. - Held, upon a submission of the controversy
under N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 546, that the title was marketable. Poztley
-e. Kafka (1925, 1st Dept.) 213 App. Div. 595, 211 N. Y. Supp. 352.
The release of the covenant was binding between the original partieS.
See 1 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 295; ef. Weiabcrg '. Sandcr
(1923, 1st Dept.) 204 App. Div. 409, 198 N. Y. Supp. 121 (involving a lot
in the same tract). But the covenant still operated as a restrictive cove-
nant in favor of other owners of lots in the tract who did not join in the
release. See Coz:dert v. Sayre (1890) 46 N. J. Eq. 386, 396, 19 At. 190,
194. A marketable title, necessary to the granting of specific performance
of an ordinary contract to purchase land, is one that is free from reason-
able danger of litigation. Howe v. Coates (1900) 97 Blinn. 385, 107 N. W.
397, and cases cited; Rife v. Lybarger (1892) 49 Ohio St. 422, 429, 31 N. E.
768, 770. Restrictive covenants have been held to constitute an encumbrance.
Dethloff v. Voit (1916, 1st Dept.) 172 App. Div. 201, 15S N. Y. Supp. 522.
The covenant in the instant case probably became specifically unenforceable
because of the changed condition of the neighborhood. Columbia College
v,. Thatcher (1882) 87 N. Y. 311. And because laches or abandonment of
purpose may be inferred from the parties' inaction for seventy-five years.
Loud v. Pendergast (1910) 206 Blass. 122, 92 N. E. 40; Baldwiia v. Trimble
(1897) 85 Aid. 396, 37 Atl. 176; 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisdiction (4th ed.
1919) sec. 1702. Valid covenants, however, whose specific enforcement is
improbable, have been held encumbrances. Maupin, Marketable Title to
Real Estate (1921) 863. The court in some cases has refused to resolve
the doubt since the parties were not before it, Jeffries v. Jeffrics (1875)
117 Mlass. 184. Judges may differ as to marketability. The title which is
declared doubtful in one case may be forced upon a purchaser in another.
Mullings v. Trinder (1870) L. R. 10 Eq. 449; see Fry, Specific Performance
(6th ed. 1921) sees. 884-886. The result of the instant case seems desir-
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able. There should be a rational doubt before a title is declared unmarket-
able. Zelman v. Kaufherr (1909, Ch.) 76 N. J. Eq. 52, 73 At. 1048; Smith '.
Reidy (1921, Ch.) 92 N. J. Eq. 586, 113 At. 774; cf. the dissenting opinion of
Pound, J. (Cardozo and Crane, J. J. concurring) in Chesebro v. Moors
(1922) 233 N. Y. 75, 82, 134 N. E. 842, 844.
WILLs-AFTER DEVISE OF FEE SIMPLE, SUBSEQUENT CLAUSE CREATINa
CONDITIONAL LIMITATION HELD VOID.-The testatrix in one paragraph of
her will devised to the plaintiff an interest in land "absolutely and in fee
simple". A subsequent paragraph provided that on the plaintiff's death
without issue all portions of the estate willed to him were to go to the heirs
of testatrix' father and mother, and that all rights given to the plaintiff
by any clause of the will were not to vest except subject to those limita-
tions and conditions. The plaintiff sued for a partition, which the lower
court allowed. Held, on appeal, that plaintiff was entitled to partition,
the attempted limitation being void on the ground of repugnancy. Todd v.
Stewart (1925, Iowa) 202 N. W. 844.
In the interpretation of a will the intention of the testator is to be
gathered from the whole instrument. Where two clauses appear inconsis-
tent, they are to be construed, if possible, so that both may stand. Smith v.
Bell (1832, U. S.) 6 Pet. 68; Rogers v. Rogers (1924) 312 Ill. 122, 143 N. E.
490. While the language of the clause giving to plaintiff an estate "abso-
lutely and in fee simple" would, if standing alone, pass a fee simple abso-
lute, the expressed intention of testatrix in the subsequent paragraph clearly
should *impose on that fee a condition and create a valid estate in the
secondary donees by way of conditional limitation. Hull v. Calvert (1920)
286 Mo. 163, 226 S. W. 553; Brightman v. Brightman (1868) 100 Mass. 238.
Where a fee is devised, coupled with an absolute power of disposal, any
limitation over is void on the grounds of repugnancy. Gannon v. Albright
(1904) 183 Mo. 238, 81 S. W. 1162; Jackson v. Bull (1813, N. Y.) 10 Johns.
19. But where, as in the instant cdse, a fee is granted with no absolute
power of disposition mentioned, subsequent words of limitation should be
valid. McRee's Adm'r v. Means (1859) 34 Ala. 349; Booker v. Booker
(1844, Tenn.) 5 Humph. 505. An executory limitation over after a fee
may be made to depend on any named contingency not obnoxious to the
rule of perpetuities nor otherwise illegal. Daniel v. Thompson (1854) 53
Ky. 533 (death without lawful issue); Chrystie v. Phyfe (1859) 19 N. Y.
344 (dying "unmarried and without leaving a child"); Bell v. Scammon
(1844) 15 N. H. 381 (death before a certain age and having no male issue).
At common law, before the introduction of uses, any limitation over after
a fee created by feoffment was void. 4 Kent, Commentaries (12th ed. 1884)
136; Palmer v. Cook (1896) 159 Ill. 300, 42 N. E. 796. After uses were
devised, a fee could be mounted on a fee by way of shifting use. Wyman
v. Brown (1863) 50 Me. 139; Sugden's Gilbert, Uses, 152. Shifting execu-
tory devises after gifts in fee have been recognized almost without dissent
ever since the Statute of Wills. 2 Jarman, Wills (6th ed. 1910) 1432;
Digby, History of the Law of Real Property (5th ed. 1897) 382. And
shifting uses were familiar interests at a considerably earlier date. Gray,
Perpetuities (3d ed. 1915) 118, 119. It is respectfully submitted that only
one of the seven cases cited in the opinion of the principal case as sus-
taining its holding is actually in point; viz., Talbot v. Snodgrass (1904) 124
Iowa, 682, 100 N. W. 500. That case, together with the one under discus-
sion, is practically unsupported by any authority outside the state of Iowa.
Cf. Carllee v. Ellsberry (1907) 82 Ark. 209, 101 S. W. 407. The will in the
instant case was so involved that the court may have wished to construe
it as simply as possible, or the policy underlying the decision may have
been that of the early common law which refused to hold valid a contingent
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future interest of a kind certain to impede the alienation of land. It is
difficult to account for the holding on any other ground.
WI.LS-DESCaNT AND DISTRIBUTION-WILL Vow IP Ctmw EN V==ma
SA MERE NOT MIENTIONED OR PRovmED Fon.-The New Jersey Wills Act
provided that a will executed when the testator had no "issue living"
should be voided by the subsequent birth of children if such children were
not provided for or mentioned in the will. The testatrix executed a will
two months before the birth of her child and died four days thereafter.
Held, that the will was voided since there was no "issue living" at the time
it was executed and no mention was made of the child subsequently born.
In re Haines' Will (1925, N. J. Prerog. Ct.) 129 AtL 867.
If a child, omitted from the will, was living when the will was made
he takes nothing, but if born subsequently he is generally permitted to
take as a pretermitted child. N. J. Wills Act, 1377, sec. 20, 21 (Comp. Sts.
sec. 5865); Cahill's N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1923, ch. 13, sec. 20. This distinction
would indicate the object of such statutes to be "to guard against such
testamentary thoughtlessness and lack of vision as prevent a testator from
contemplating the possibility of afterborn children". McLean v. MeLcan
(1913) 207 N. Y. 365, 101 N. E. 178. If this be so, to apply the statute to
the instant case would involve the assumption that the testatrix, two
months before the birth of her child, might not have "contemplated the
possibility of afterborn children". It has been suggested that the statute
might be satisfied by considering the testatrx condition as a sufficient
"mention" to indicate intention to disinherit. Cf. McCnrwa v. McCrum (1910,
2d Dept.) 141 App. Div. 83, 125 N. Y. Supp. 717 (facts identical with
instant case-lower court had found specific intent to disinherit). But
the general rule is that an intention to disinherit must appear in the will
and may not be shown by parol. Re Estate of Jean Gcrraud (18S8) 35
Calif. 336; In re Patterson s Estate (1925) 282 Pa. 396, 128 At. 100. And
a number of jurisdictions have, therefore, reached the result of the instant
case under similar statutes. McCruin v. McCrunm, supra; Pcarce v. Car-
gington (1909, Tex. Civ. App.) 124 S. W. 469; In re Pattrsonws Estate,
supra; Thompson v. Thompson (1924) 229 Mlich. 520, 201 N. W. 533. But
none of these cases has considered the fact that the child en 'cwtre sa mere
is for many purposes considered as "born". The court in the instant case
states that this fiction can only be applied when for the benefit of the
child. It has, however, been applied where it did not worh for the benefit
of the child. Holbrook v. Holbrook (1920, 2d Dept.) 193 App. Div. 28G,
183 N. Y. Supp. 728 (provision for a conditional gift to "surviving issue"
held a "mention" of child born five months after testator's death so as to
defeat inheritence by that child). Whether the child be classed as born
before or after the date of the will should depend on the purpose of that
classification. That purpose is here to require that children already born
need not be expressly mentioned in order to show that they have been
given due consideration. Where, as in the instant case, the existence of
the child must have been appreciated by the testatrix when making the will
it would seem more in accord with the testatrix' state of mind to consider
the child "born" at that time. But this logical accuracy is probably pre-
cluded by the disinclination of courts to recognize a disinheritance not
decisively expressed.
